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The Next Chapter of  ‘Wrongful Life’: Concepts 
for ‘Wrongful Survival’ in Comparative Analysis
BenedIkt Bartylla*
aBstraCt
This article revisits the controversial concept of  ‘wrongful life’ in comparative 
analysis of  English and German law. In a recent decision, the German Federal 
Court of  Justice dealt with the question of  whether damages can be awarded for 
pain suffered because of  an unnecessarily prolonged life. This novel case challenges 
the doctrines that courts on “both sides of  the channel” have developed in previous 
cases of  ‘wrongful life’. The article discusses the development of  English and 
German law with regard to cases of  ‘wrongful life’ in order to find a conceptually 
coherent solution to the issue new issue of  ‘wrongful survival’.
I. IntroduCtIon
Questions of  law are, in modern times, rarely a question of  life and death. 
Sometimes, however, questions of  life and death can become questions of  law. 
Whenever that is the case, courts have to strike a balance between fundamental 
questions of  morality on the one hand and basic concepts of  private and especially 
tort law on the other hand. Consequently, these cases have always challenged 
the way we think about tort law. In a recent decision, the German Federal Court 
of  Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter BGH)1 had to decide on a claim brought 
against a doctor who in the view of  the claimants unnecessarily prolonged the life 
of  their father and therefore caused him to suffer. While the BGH dismissed the 
*  LL.B. (Candidate) at Bucerius Law School, Hamburg; Visiting Student at Trinity College, Univer-
sity of  Cambridge (Michaelmas 2019). I want to thank Dr Jodi Gardner for her encouragement 
and guidance. I further want to thank the editors for their valuable comments. All errors remain 
entirely my own.
1 The BGH is the highest civil court in Germany.
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case, important conceptual questions are still to be answered. In this regard, such 
cases of  ‘wrongful survival’ further challenge our understanding of  tort law. This 
challenge, however, is not entirely new. Cases of  ‘wrongful life’ have been discussed 
in both English and German law for over 40 years and can provide important 
guidance with regard to ‘wrongful survival’.
Until recently, these cases always concerned the unwanted or ‘wrongful’ 
birth of  a child. Courts had to decide on claims based on the birth of  a child who, 
in the eyes of  the parents or the child itself, should never have been born. These 
cases have to be the starting point of  any discussion regarding the novel cases of  
‘wrongful survival’. I argue that the way English and German courts have dealt 
with the claim of  the child shows that courts in these two jurisdictions share a 
common set of  values and legal principles. 
Subsequently, I argue that English and German courts have left their 
common ground when dealing with the claims of  the parents. While English courts 
have started to award damages for ‘loss of  autonomy’, German courts also award 
damages but based on economic loss. With regard to English law, the question raised 
by these developments is how ‘loss of  autonomy’ fits into the existing landscape of  
English tort law. I argue that acknowledging loss of  autonomy as a regular head 
of  damage, as suggested by academic writers, is not supported by case law and 
does not fit into the structure of  English tort law. I further argue that English law 
should instead acknowledge a new intentional tort, protecting important parts of  
human autonomy, that is actionable per se. Financial support for the parents, for 
which there is a strong case from a policy perspective, should instead be provided 
by a statutory provision, in order to keep questions of  legal and social policy apart.
These findings provide guidance when deciding on ‘wrongful survival’. 
While these cases do not concern the beginning of  a human life but rather the 
end of  one, the core problems remain the same. I argue that English courts, when 
presented with a case of  “wrongful survival”, should apply the proposed intentional 
tort. 
II. a note on termInology
A specific issue when discussing these cases, especially in comparative 
analysis, is one of  terminology. To distinguish the three cases mentioned so far, 
I will use the following terminology. The first group, regarding the claims of  a 
child after birth, will be discussed as cases of  ‘wrongful life’. The second group of  
cases, regarding the corresponding claims of  the parents, will be called ‘wrongful 
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conception’.2 The last group of  cases will be called ‘wrongful survival’. I use the 
term ‘wrongful existence’ as a collective term for all three groups of  cases. 
III. wrongful lIfe
a. england and wales
This issue of  wrongful life reached English courts in 1982 in the case 
of  McKay v Essex AHA (hereafter, McKay).3 In this case, an infant was born with 
severe disabilities caused by an infection of  rubella (German measles) suffered 
by the mother during the pregnancy. A doctor negligently failed to diagnose the 
mother’s illness during her pregnancy. Had the mother known that she suffered 
from rubella, she would have terminated the pregnancy. The child brought a claim 
for damages against the doctor for suffering a life with disabilities. The Court of  
Appeal unanimously held that there was no cause of  action to claim damages for 
wrongful life. 
This decision was based on two main arguments. Firstly, the court held that 
there is no common law duty owed to the foetus to terminate a pregnancy.4 Both 
the statutes on the termination of  pregnancies (namely the Abortion Act 1967 
and the Infant Life Act 1929) and public policy led the court to this conclusion. 
Stephenson LJ held that such a duty ran contrary to Section 5(1) of  the Abortion 
Act 1967 and would constitute a violation of  the ‘sanctity of  human life’, as the 
life of  an affected foetus would be regarded as being “so much less valuable [than 
the life of  a child without disabilities] that it was not worth preserving”.5 This 
argument is an interesting example of  how the focus on the concept of  ‘duty’ in 
English tort law can in some cases provide a grip on the issue at hand. In this case, 
the concept of  duty provides an entrance door for other legal rules, allowing the 
court to integrate the law on abortion into tort law. 
Secondly, the court held that damages could not be assessed by a court in 
this case and therefore could not be awarded.6 This argument arose because the 
disability itself  was not caused by the doctor. The injury caused could therefore 
only be the fact that the claimant was alive. Presented with this injury, the court 
2 This terminology is not entirely precise. The group “wrongful conception” also includes cases 
in which a doctor negligently fails to provide information that would have led to an abortion. In 
these cases, it is not the conception that is wrongful cf  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 
59 (HL) [99] (Lord Clyde). However, there is no legal distinction pertaining to this terminological 
difference and thus I will use the term wrongful conception for both sub-groups. 
3 McKay v Essex AHA [1982] QB 1166 (CA).
4 ibid [1180].
5 ibid. The argument was also supported by Ackner LJ at [1188].
6 ibid [1182].
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held that it would have to assess the value of  non-existence to examine the damage, 
and it found itself  unable to do so. Ackner LJ asked, “[b]ut how can a court begin 
to evaluate non-existence, ‘the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller 
returns?’”.7 This argument presents a key issue in cases of  ‘wrongful existence’. It 
is not surprising that the court turned to Shakespeare8 to verbalize the question 
that it ultimately found itself  uncapable of  answering. The key issue is that current 
legal principles do not provide a morally appropriate method of  assessing the value 
of  death in comparison to life. The Court of  Appeal took the first important step 
by realising that this question cannot and should not be answered. This is why, if  
a court wants to award damages based on the existence of  a human life, it will 
have to look at the case from a different perspective. In this regard, McKay was the 
starting point for the legal development that was yet to happen.
The judges also unanimously gave their opinion on the law following the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. This statute did not govern 
McKay, because the child was born before the statute was enacted. In its report 
regarding this Act the Law Commission stated:
We do not think that, in the strict sense of  the term, an action for 
“wrongful life” should lie… Such a cause of  action, if  it existed, 
would place an almost intolerable burden on medical advisers in 
their socially and morally exacting role.9
The court in McKay held per curiam that the enactment of  the Congenital 
Disabilities Act prevented the acceptance of  a claim for wrongful life.10
B. germany
In Germany the BGH decided a case identical to McKay. A child suffered 
from severe disabilities after its mother had contracted rubella during the 
7 ibid [1189].
8 The passage quoted by Ackner LJ can be found in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Act 3 Scene 1, in which 
Hamlet reflects on the nature of  life and death, considers suicide, and famously coins the phrase 
‘to be or not to be’.
9 The Law Commission, Injuries to Unborn Children (Law Com No 6 1974) para 89.
10 McKay (n 3) 1187 (Stephenson LJ). The Act was amended in 1990 to adapt to the reality of  in 
vitro fertilisation (see s 1a). This amendment has caused some uncertainty regarding the future of  
wrongful life claims that have been discussed by Rosamund Scott, ‘Reconsidering wrongful life 
in England after Thirty Years: Legislative Mistakes and Unjustifiable Anomalies’ (2013) 72 CLJ 
115. Scott argues in favour of  allowing a claim that is focused on the disability and not the fact of  
existence. This notion cannot be discussed here.
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pregnancy.11 Similar to the Court of  Appeal, the BGH dismissed the claim brought 
by the child.12 
In its judgment, the BGH relied on very similar arguments to those that 
had guided the Court of  Appeal. McKay was also explicitly cited. The BGH agreed 
that it was not possible to assess the value of  death in comparison to life.13 Like the 
Court of  Appeal, the BGH also held that there was no duty owed to the child by 
the doctor to terminate the pregnancy.14 This argument does not come as a surprise 
to anyone who has read McKay, but it is noteworthy from a German perspective. 
German tort law does not usually focus on the concept of  ‘duty’ but rather on the 
infringement of  a right.15 It is not entirely new that the BGH uses this concept, but 
the emphasis put on the question of  ‘duty’ does show that McKay heavily influenced 
the German court. It seems that the BGH ‘borrowed’ both concept and argument 
from the Court of  Appeal.
The BGH also emphasised the moral implications of  the case, holding that 
allowing the claim would violate the sanctity of  life.16 Moreover, pointing to the 
experiences in the Third Reich, the court added: 
As a matter of  principle, the judiciary of  the Federal Republic of  
Germany, influenced by the experiences gained during the national-
socialist unjust regime (nationalsozialistische Unrechtsherrschaft), does 
not allow a legally significant judgment on the value of  the life of  
a human being and it does so with good reason.17
Allgemein erlaubt gerade die durch die Erfahrung mit 
der nationalsozialistischen Unrechtsherrschaft beeinflußte 
Rechtsprechung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aus gutem 
Grund kein rechtlich relevantes Urteil über den Lebenswert 
fremden Lebens.18
The way in which the BGH openly discusses the judgment of  the Court 
of  Appeal and also arguments brought forward in other jurisdictions, namely the 
11 The BGH and others sometimes refer to the case as the “rubella-case”.
12 BGH VI ZR 114/81, NJW 1983, 1371.
13 ibid 1374.
14 ibid 1373.
15 This is due to the structure of  the central legal rule in German tort law: s 823(1) BGB. This provi-
sion gives rise to a claim in tort law only if  the claimant can prove the infringement of  a so-called 
‘absolute right’, namely health and property. 
16 BGH VI ZR 114/81, NJW 1983, 1373.
17 All German excerpts are translated into English by the author. The original German excerpts are 
cited below the translations.
18 BGH VI ZR 114/81, NJW 1983, 1371.
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US, is quite remarkable from a German perspective. German courts hardly ever 
take into account foreign judgments which is largely due to the strict doctrinal 
approach of  German law. But this case can and should serve as an example of  
a practical comparative approach, especially in tort law, that can lead to well-
reasoned decisions.  
C. ComparIson
The above analysis shows that English courts have provided the groundwork 
for cases of  wrongful life. The fact that German courts have adopted this approach 
is evidence that the Court of  Appeal has presented persuasive arguments. A 
comparative approach has led to a well-established common foundation on which 
the courts on ‘both sides of  the Channel’ have based their decisions in cases of  
wrongful life. The common ground shared by English and German courts is to be 
kept in mind when analysing the differences that have started to appear in cases of  
‘wrongful conception’. 
IV. wrongful ConCeptIon
As English and German courts were forced to leave this common ground 
and further explore the implications of  wrongful existence, their unity faded. 
Courts in the two jurisdictions ultimately adopted different approaches in cases 
of  wrongful conception. In these cases, claims were brought against medical 
personnel who negligently failed to successfully perform medical procedures meant 
to prevent pregnancies (such as vasectomies), ultimately causing the claimants to 
have ‘unwanted’ children. Claimants in these cases have frequently tried to claim 
damages based on two grounds: the pain of  childbirth and the costs associated 
with the upbringing of  the child. The former has not sparked much debate as both 
German and English courts regard the pain suffered by the mother as recoverable 
damage.19 This issue needs no further consideration. The financial loss caused 
by the upbringing of  the child, however, has proven to be a controversial issue. 
19 BGH VI ZR 136/01, NJW 2002, 2636; McFarlane (n 2) (Lord Millett dissenting). 
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Whilst it is clear that raising children costs money, it was heavily disputed whether 
morality or legal policy prohibited the law from regarding such costs as ‘damage’.
a. germany 
This question made its way to the BGH in 1980, after lower courts had 
delivered various conflicting judgments regarding wrongful conception.20 The 
case decided by the BGH concerned a mother who underwent an unsuccessful 
sterilisation surgery. After giving birth to a healthy child, she sought damages under 
breach of  contract21 for maintenance of  her child. The Regional Court (Landgericht, 
hereafter “LG”) allowed the claim, but this was overturned by the Higher Regional 
Court (Oberlandesgericht, hereafter “OLG”) Bamberg.22 The OLG Bamberg held 
that maintenance of  the child was not recoverable because regarding the child as 
damage would violate the child’s dignity as protected by Article 1(1) of  the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz, hereafter “GG”).23 It dismissed the notion that it was not 
the child itself  but merely the legal obligation24 of  the parents to care for the child 
which constituted the damage. In the eyes of  the court, the child and the obligation 
to care for it was untenable.25 
The BGH in turn overruled the OLG Bamberg, holding that the 
maintenance costs were recoverable.26 The court accepted the distinction between 
the existence of  the child and the legal obligation of  the parents to care for the 
child, which the OLG Bamberg had dismissed. It held that this obligation alone is 
the economic damage suffered by the parents and that the distinction between child 
20 See LG Itzehoe 6 O 66/68, FamRZ 69, 90; LG Munich I 17 O 771/69, FamRZ 70, 314; LG 
Freiburg 7 O 117/76, NJW 1977, 340; LG Duisburg 74 8 O 349/73; VersR 75, 342; OLG Düs-
seldorf  8 U 123/73, NJW 1975 595; OLG Celle 1 U 37/77, NJW 1978, 1688; OLG Zweibrücken 
1 U 116/77, NJW 1978, 2340; OLG Karlsruhe 4 U 3/77, NJW 1979, 599.
21 In Germany, cases of  wrongful conception are discussed within contract law for two reasons: 
Firstly, only damage arising from infringement of  a so-called ‘absolute right’ (absolutes Recht) as set 
out by s 823(1) BGB is recoverable under German tort law and the BGH has expressed doubts 
whether the maintenance costs can be claimed under tort law in BGH VI ZR 247/78, NJW 1980, 
1452. Secondly, under German Contract Law there is always a contract between the doctor and 
the patient regardless of  whether a hospital is run by the state. This does not constitute an impor-
tant difference to English law, as German contract law does not follow a doctrine of  strict liability, 
see s 280(1) BGB. 
22 OLG Bamberg 4 U 141/77, NJW 1978, 1685.
23 ibid 1685.
24 Under German Family Law the child has a claim against its parents to care for it (Unterh-
altsanspruch, see Sections 1601 and following of  the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
hereafter “BGB”)).
25 OLG Bamberg 4 U 141/77, NJW 1978, 1686.
26 BGH VI ZR 105/78, NJW 1980, 1450. 
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and economic damage does not conflict with German Family or Constitutional 
Law.27 
The BGH also laid out general guidelines for calculating the award without, 
however, providing reliable rules.28 According to these guidelines, the amount of  
damages does not depend on the actual amount spent on the care of  the child 
but on the amount that the parents are legally obliged to provide for their child. 
Liability is therefore limited to the minimum amount of  care. This was imposed 
to avoid the issue of  varying amounts of  damages depending on the wealth of  the 
parents. For cases decided in 2020, based on the guidelines that were laid out in 
this early decision, courts can award an amount of  up to 141.696€ for the birth of  
a healthy child.29
The BGH went on to confirm this ruling in a case regarding an unsuccessful 
(legal) abortion30 and a case of  false information given by doctors preventing 
a (legal) abortion.31 In none of  these decisions, however, did the BGH provide 
an extensive discussion of  whether the distinction made between the child and 
the obligation to care for it really does avoid the moral implications of  the case. 
It seems that the BGH tried to avoid this issue by focussing on the fact that the 
27 BGH NJW 1980, 1451.
28 See ibid 1452.
29 The claim of  the child against its parents under German law consists of  two elements. A financial 
care element (Barunterhalt) and a personal care element (Betreuungsunterhalt). The BGH held that the 
award should amount to the amount of  financial care plus a reasonable amount to substitute the 
personal care element (BGH NJW 1980, 1452). This can mean doubling the financial element (see 
BGH NJW 2007, 989, para 29). The amount of  the financial element, however, depends on the 
financial situation of  the parents. As this would mean that the amount of  damages would increase 
if  the affected parents are wealthier, the BGH clarified that the amount of  damages cannot be 
fully coherent with the amount owed to the child under family law. The practical solution is that 
courts award the amount that is set by law to be the minimum amount in any case (Mindestunterhalt). 
This minimum amount is set out by s 1612a German Civil Code in connection with a statutory 
instrument (secondary legislation) based on s 1612a(4) BGB (Mindestunterhaltsverordnung). Social 
benefits for children based on the German “Children Benefits Act” (Kindergeld nach Bundeskin-
dergeldgesetz) are subtracted. The amount is calculated for 18 years. For 2020, the minimal financial 
care as set out by the statutory instrument is 369€ for the first six years, 424€ for the next and 497€ 
for the last six years. Over 18 years this adds up to 92.880€. This can be doubled to substitute the 
personal care element, adding up to 185.760€. Benefits for children amount to 204€ a month, 
adding up to 44.064€ in total. This adds up to 141.696€ in total.
30 BGH VI 244/83, NJW 1985, 2752. 
31 BGH VI ZR 85/82, NJW 1984, 658.
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parents were now burdened with the costs of  maintaining a child and holding that 
this was therefore an “easy case” of  straight-forward economic damage. 
Three years later, however, the debate was sparked anew by a decision 
of  the Federal Constitutional Court32 (Bundesverfassungsgericht, hereafter BVerfG). 
In a landmark decision involving the review on constitutional grounds (abstraktes 
Normenkontrollverfahren)33 of  German laws on abortion, the Second Senate of  the 
BVerfG passed a brief  remark that had the potential to completely reverse the 
judicial treatment of  wrongful conception.34 The Senate noted: 
The legal qualification of  the existence of  a child as damage is 
prohibited by constitutional law… The duty of  the state to respect 
every human existence in and for itself… does not allow regarding 
the obligation to care for a child as damage. In this regard, the 
decisions of  the civil courts… are in need of  review.
Eine rechtliche Qualifikation des Daseins eines Kindes als 
Schadensquelle kommt hingegen von Verfassungs wegen… nicht 
in Betracht. Die Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt, jeden 
Menschen in seinem Dasein um seiner selbst willen zu achten… 
verbietet es, die Unterhaltspflicht für ein Kind als Schaden zu 
begreifen. Die Rechtsprechung der Zivilgerichte… ist im Blick 
darauf  der Überprüfung bedürftig.35
As the decision did not actually concern any cases regarding wrongful 
conception, the comments were obiter dictum and were therefore not legally binding.36 
It is worth considering, however, that in German law, the opinions of  the BVerfG 
32 The Federal Constitutional Court fulfils a special role within the German court system. Regular 
private law disputes are settled by the so-called civil courts (Zivilgerichte), the BGH being the highest 
civil court. There are no appeals against BGH decisions. The Federal Constitutional Court has ju-
risdiction over a limited number of  actions that solely regard German Constitutional Law. These 
actions include actions brought by citizens against judicial decisions on the basis that they violate 
constitutional law (Verfassungsbeschwerden). This way, decisions of  the BGH and other civil courts can 
be overturned, but only on constitutional grounds.
33 This is a procedure in which the BVerfG reviews whether or not a law conforms with constitution-
al law, without this question being raised in a proceeding in front of  another court. This action 
can be brought by the federal government, a state government, or a quarter of  the members of  
the German federal parliament (Bundestag). This specific action was brought by the government of  
Bavaria.
34 BVerfG 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, 2 BvF 5/92, NJW 1993, 1751.
35 ibid 1764.
36 Decisions of  the BVerfG are generally binding for all courts according to s 31 of  the Federal Con-
stitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), but that does not apply to remarks made obiter 
dictum such as in this case.
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are highly persuasive. After this decision, it was clear that the strategy of  the BGH 
had failed. The moral implications were picked up by the BVerfG and the BGH 
saw itself  confronted with the imminent threat of  being overturned. Nonetheless, 
when the time came for the BGH to review its opinion, the court decided not to 
follow the remarks made by the Second Senate. 
The BGH held that no legal principle was violated by regarding the 
obligation to care for the child to be damage.37 This time, the BGH discussed 
the problems addressed by the BVerfG in detail, rejecting the argument that the 
award of  damages violates the child’s dignity. The BGH defended the distinction 
made in its previous decision, holding that while the birth of  the child was, of  
course, a cause for the obligation of  the parents and the consequent financial 
loss, regarding this as damage carried no ‘verdict’ with regard to the child.38 The 
BGH did not attribute a negative meaning to the legal classification of  a certain 
event as damage.39 Furthermore, the BGH presented an argument on the basis 
of  coherence: As the wish of  the parents to prevent childbirth is seen by the law 
to be legitimate, the law also has to compensate for the financial loss caused by 
childbirth.40 This way, the BGH delivered an extensive reply to the remarks of  the 
BVerfG.
One further aspect that was not discussed by the BGH in its first judgment 
but is addressed in the second judgment, although in a very brief  manner, is the 
question of  loss of  autonomy. The court explicitly rejected the idea of  awarding 
damages for the loss of  autonomy suffered by the parents, without however giving 
any compelling arguments.41 The lack of  discussion in this regard is not surprising, 
as it is exactly the kind of  discussion that the BGH apparently wanted to avoid 
when it chose to apply the ‘easy’ concept of  economic damage. 
The issue then made its way to the BVerfG for a second time, this time 
by way of  a direct challenge on constitutional grounds (Verfassungsbeschwerde)42 of  
two judgments, in which lower courts had followed the ruling of  the BGH. These 
challenges ended up before the First Senate of  the BVerfG, which did not follow 
37 BGH VI ZR 105/92, NJW 1994, 788. 
38 ibid 791.
39 ibid 792. 
40 ibid 788.
41 ibid 791–792. 
42 This action can be brought by anyone who claims that their constitutional rights were violated by 
acts of  the German State, see Art 93(1) Nr. 4a GG. It can also be used to challenge judgments on 
constitutional grounds, which is what happened in this case.
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the opinion of  the Second Senate.43 It held that the decisions based on the opinion 
of  the BGH did not violate constitutional law.44 The starting point in this decision 
was Article 1(1) GG in its function as a ‘guideline’ for judicial decisions.45 The 
First Senate held that the BGH did not violate the principle of  human dignity 
because the value of  the child’s existence is not dependent on who bears the costs 
of  raising the child. It saw support for this in the different factual circumstances 
under which maintenance claims can be owed by a person other than the parents.46 
For example, if  a parent is killed by an act of  negligence, the tortfeasor is liable for 
the maintenance claims the child would have had against the victim (see Section 
844(2) BGB). The court also pointed out that the details of  a maintenance claim 
can vary, even when owed by a parent. For example, a person adopting his wife’s 
or husband’s child after the other biological parent has died owes less financial 
support to the child than the surviving biological parent, even though the new 
father or mother is otherwise regarded as a ‘full parent’.47 From these and other 
examples, the court deduced that the legal structure of  the maintenance claim, 
including the question of  who the maintenance claim is owed by, is not necessarily 
tied to the child. Therefore, the court held that holding the doctor liable for the 
maintenance costs in a case of  wrongful conception does not carry any meaning 
with regard to the child’s value in the eyes of  the law. This way, the First Senate 
provided further groundwork for the argument that the BGH had already brought 
forward.
This decision concluded an almost unprecedented judicial battle in 
Germany. The BGH chose to approach the issue in a more or less conventional way 
but was faced with the evolutionary pressure of  wrongful conception at least after 
the BVerfG had demanded a more extensive treatment of  the moral implications. 
The intensity of  the debate shows just how much pressure German law was under. 
Ultimately, however, the BGH was able to stick to its approach, leading to an 
43 S 16 of  the Federal Constitutional Court Act requires a joint decision of  both Senates in case 
one Senate wants to overturn decisions made by the other Senate. The First Senate, however, 
refused to hand the matter to a joint hearing as it was of  the opinion that the remarks made by the 
Second Senate were not part of  the ratio of  the first decision and therefore did not fall under s 16. 
A judicial statement issued by the Second Senate (NJW 1998, 523), in which the Second Senate 
expressed that it was of  the opinion that s 16 did apply, did not have any effect. 
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integration of  wrongful conception into tort law rather than an evolution of  tort 
law because of  wrongful conception.
B. england and wales 
In England, cases regarding wrongful conception also began to occupy 
the courts around 1980. In Scuriaga v Powell48 it was first held that a doctor who 
negligently failed to carry out an abortion was liable for the pain suffered during 
birth, the prospective and actual loss of  earnings and the diminution of  marriage 
prospects. The report in this case does not mention damages for maintenance of  
the child. Similar cases in the following decades led to a variety of  outcomes in 
lower courts.49 However, it was not until 1999 that the issue reached the House of  
Lords in the case of  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (hereafter, McFarlane).50
(i) McFarlane v Tayside Health Board
In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (hereafter, McFarlane), a claim was brought 
by a married couple who had decided not to have another child. The husband 
underwent vasectomy, which was carried out by an employee of  the defendant. 
After surgery, the husband submitted sperm samples to the defendant’s hospital for 
an analysis. The husband was then notified that the vasectomy had been successful 
and contraceptive methods were no longer necessary. However, about one year 
later, his wife got pregnant and went on to give birth to a healthy child. The couple 
brought a claim against the Health Board. The parents claimed damages for the 
pain suffered by the mother, which was allowed by the House of  Lords, Lord 
Millett dissenting. The parents also claimed damages for the upbringing of  the 
unwanted child. 
The Lord Ordinary dismissed this claim, but this was overturned by the 
Inner House of  the Court of  Sessions, which held that there was no principle 
ruling out the prima facie liability of  the defendant. The defendant appealed. 
The House of  Lords unanimously allowed the appeal. The judgment 
shows, however, that a unanimous decision is not always supported by a clear 
and unanimous ratio. Lord Steyn later termed it a ‘gruesome task’51 to discuss the 
opinions expressed in McFarlane. The opinions discuss a variety of  approaches, 
leaving behind a tangled web of  arguments. A complete and comprehensive 
48 [1979] 123 SJ 406.
49 See Udale v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1983] 1 WLR 1098; Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and 
Westminster Area Health Authority [1985] QB 1012 (CA); Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644 (CA); Allen v 
Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] 1 All ER 651; Allan v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1998] SLT 580.
50 McFarlane (n 2).
51 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 321.
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discussion of  the opinions is beyond what is possible and necessary in this article 
and has already been presented elsewhere.52 However, it is necessary to outline the 
main ideas expressed by the judges in order to understand the further development 
of  the law in later cases.
The different opinions expressed in the speeches can be divided into two 
groups. One group of  judges, comprising Lords Slynn, Clyde, and Hope, focused 
on case law and principles of  tort law in order to justify their decision, while the 
other group, comprising Lords Steyn and Millett, focused on the policy implications 
of  the case. Both approaches, however, did not provide the discussion of  both 
concepts and policy that was necessary to settle this issue, which will also be shown 
in the following.
1. The conceptual approach
The strongest voice in this group was Lord Slynn, who dismissed the claim 
based on Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman (hereafter, Caparo). 53 He clarified that his 
decision was not based on policy considerations but on the “inherent limitations 
of  liability”.54 Applying the Caparo test, he decided that there was no duty of  
care, because liability for the maintenance of  a child would not be fair, just and 
reasonable.55 Similarly, Lord Clyde decided to rely on the concept of  ‘reasonable 
compensation’, holding that the claim must fail as the damages sought were 
disproportionate to the breach of  duty.56 
There are two key issues pertaining to this approach. Firstly, this approach 
masks the actual reasoning behind the judicial opinion. It is indeed striking, that 
both Lords did not give further arguments for why compensation would not be 
reasonable. It appears that both Lords, going against their declared approach, 
considered the moral implications but chose not to express this. This was also 
criticised by Lord Steyn: 
My Lords, to explain decisions denying a remedy … by saying that 
there is no loss, no foreseeable loss, no causative link or no ground 
for reasonable restitution is to resort to unrealistic and formalistic 
propositions which mask the real reasons for the decisions. And 
52 See Kenneth McK Norrie, ‘Failed sterilisation and economic loss: Justice, law and policy in 
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board’ (2000) 16 PN 76; Laura Hoyano, ‘Misconceptions about Wrongful 
Conceptions’ (2002) 65 MLR 883; Nicolette Priaulx, ‘Joy to the World! A (Healthy) Child is Born! 
Reconceptualizing ‘Harm’ in Wrongful Conception’ (2004) 13 Social & Legal Studies 5.
53 [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL).
54 McFarlane (n 2) [76].
55 ibid.
56 ibid [105].
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judges ought to strive to give the real reasons for their decision.57
Secondly, this approach does not take into account the nature of  concepts 
in tort law. The concepts laid out in Caparo and elsewhere are not blind, mechanical 
limits of  liability but rather legal institutions that provide a structure for solving 
situations of  colliding interests. It is not possible to apply these concepts in a purely 
‘technical’ manner. The weight of  the colliding interests is what decides a case. 
This approach is trying to put on a mask that tort law simply does not provide.
2. The policy-approach
Turning now to the approach that moves away from tort law concepts and 
towards the moral implications of  the case. Lord Steyn addressed whether or not a 
court should follow moral guidance: 
The court must apply positive law. But judges’ sense of  the moral 
answer to a question, or the justice of  the case, has been one of  the 
great shaping forces of  the common law.58
He continued by expressing his belief  that society would be opposed 
to liability of  the surgeons and health system in cases of  wrongful conception, 
referring to ‘distributive justice’ as the underlying principle for this belief.59 He held 
that there is a public perception that the Health Services should not be burdened 
with the costs of  raising a child. 
Lord Millett also openly focused on policy, holding that the principle of  
‘sanctity of  human life’, which was also decisive in McKay, does not allow the law 
to view childbirth (or the costs attributed to raising a child) as damage:
“But society itself  must regard the balance [of  the joys and burdens 
of  raising a child] as beneficial. It would be repugnant to its own 
sense of  values to do otherwise.”60
The policy-approach has been criticised in academic writing for lacking 
empirical and legal basis, especially with regard to the assumptions made by Lord 
Steyn.61 On the other hand, it is submitted that this case simply cannot be solved 




60 McFarlane (n 2) [114].
61 Victoria Chico, ‘Wrongful Conception: Policy, Inconsistency and the Conventional Award’ (2007) 
8 MedLInt 139, 145–149, 152–154; Hoyano (n 52) 904.
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by the judicial struggle in Germany following the first ‘policy blind’ judgment of  
the BGH.  But it is indeed striking that this approach, while making the necessary 
step towards a policy-based decision, stops short of  providing an extensive and 
conclusive discussion of  policy arguments and the way in which these can be 
included in a case of  tort law. The principle of  sanctity of  human life may well 
be a persuasive argument but there is still an imminent lack of  discussion and 
conceptual analysis. This is again, evidenced by the fact that the BGH discussed 
the same moral principles but arrived at the opposite conclusion.
Interestingly, Lord Steyn made mention of  the German judgments. 
However, he only mentioned the first judgment of  the BVerfG and the following 
judgment of  the BGH, leaving out the important second judgment of  the BVerfG 
that was also delivered before McFarlane.62 That is because Lord Steyn relied on the 
3rd edition of  Markesinis’s German Law of  Torts (OUP 1997), that was published in 
1997 and therefore did not include the second decision of  the BVerfG, which was 
delivered in 1998. It is, of  course, doubtful whether this missing piece of  information 
would have changed Lord Steyn’s mind, but it is an interesting example of  how 
comparative analysis can also be a risky business.
(ii) Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust
With regard to the lack of  discussion, the judgment in McFarlane is akin to 
the first judgment delivered by the BGH. In both judgments the difficult question 
of  how to handle the moral implications of  the case was the elephant in the room. 
It is no surprise that, just like in Germany, the issue was far from being settled after 
the House of  Lords had delivered their first judgment. 
English courts reconsidered these controversial issues in Parkinson v St James 
and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust (hereafter, Parkinson).63 The facts are a slight 
variation of  McFarlane. A woman underwent sterilisation surgery at the defendants’ 
hospital, which was, however, carried out negligently, leaving her able to conceive 
children. The woman went on to conceive a child, who was born with severe 
disabilities. She brought a claim against the hospital trust, claiming maintenance 
for her child. The trial judge awarded damages for the special costs that arose 
because of  the disability, but not for basic maintenance. Both parties appealed. 
The Court of  Appeal dismissed both appeals, with speeches delivered by Brooke 
and Hale LJJ. 
Brooke LJ held that this case, because of  the special needs of  the child, 
required different treatment and judgment in the light of  ‘distributive justice’.64 
62 ibid [80].
63 [2002] QB 266 (CA).
64 ibid [49]–[51].
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He held that compensation for the special costs of  raising a disabled child would 
be fair, just and reasonable and a limitation therefore not backed by policy 
implications. This opinion, just like those criticised above, suffers from the same 
lack of  groundwork and discussion. 
Hale LJ delivered a detailed speech, providing an extensive discussion of  
McFarlane. Before turning to the material aspects of  the case, Hale LJ delivered 
some very noteworthy groundwork on the burdens of  pregnancy and child-birth 
for the mother.65 Her speech is the first to recognise this issue as an issue of  gender 
equality and feminist jurisprudence, by expressly relying on the loss of  autonomy 
suffered by the mother specifically. Based on this, she also brought up some practical 
criticism with regard to the outcome of  McFarlane:
Late abortion brings with it particular problems […]. Their 
Lordships unanimously took the view that it was not reasonable 
to expect a woman to mitigate her loss by having an abortion. 
Realistically, some may think, the result of  their Lordships’ 
decision could well be that some have no other sensible option.66
Importantly, she held that, in McFarlane, only Lord Slynn based his opinion 
on the lack of  a duty of  care, which would render any damage unrecoverable in 
any case, while the majority of  speeches left enough room for the court to free 
itself  from the grip of  McFarlane.67 She came to the conclusion that the ratio in 
McFarlane was based on a ‘deemed equilibrium’ between the joys of  childbirth and 
the costs of  childbirth.68 In her opinion, this equilibrium is disturbed if  the child 
is disabled.69 Consequently, she held that the additional costs of  raising a disabled 
child were recoverable in order to re-establish the equilibrium. 
Hale’s speech is the first to provide a conclusive foundation. In this regard, 
her speech is of  a much higher argumentative value than those discussed so far. 
However, both of  Hale LJ’s interpretations of  McFarlane are only supported by 
very few passages in the McFarlane judgment. Most importantly, the notion of  an 
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of  the speeches. On the contrary, the idea of  setting-off the benefits brought by the 
child was explicitly dismissed by several of  the Lords.70 
These considerations give good reason to doubt that her opinion is in line 
with McFarlane. While the following decision of  the House of  Lords did not settle 
this issue, Hale’s approach was labelled “anomalous”71 and “not… consistent with 
McFarlane”.72 This has led academic writers to the conclusion that Parkinson is still 
good law, but vulnerable to challenge.73 
(iii) Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust
The last leading case is Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust (hereafter, 
Rees), which provides yet another variation of  the facts in McFarlane. In this case, a 
severely visually impaired mother underwent sterilisation surgery, which was not 
successful due to the negligence of  the surgeons. She went on to give birth to 
a healthy child. The Court of  First Instance did not award any damages. This 
decision was overturned by the Court of  Appeal, which (analogous to Parkinson) 
awarded damages for the costs that arose because of  the mother’s disability. The 
claimant appealed against that decision, asking the House of  Lords to consider 
overturning McFarlane or to amend its judgment for cases that involve disabilities. 
The court unanimously decided that McFarlane was not to be overturned.74 
However, the court did depart from McFarlane by finding an alternative legal basis 
for a monetary award. To bridge the gap between any new award and the ruling 
in McFarlane, the court made use of  two ideas set out in McFarlane and Parkinson. 
The first idea was suggested by Lord Millett in McFarlane. In his speech 
he had suggested awarding a fixed conventional award to “reflect the true nature 
of  the wrong”.75 In his opinion the claimants had suffered both injury and loss, 
which entitled them to a conventional award that in his opinion should not 
exceed £5000. The second idea was provided by Hale’s speech in Parkinson. She 
put forth the argument that the claim should be based on the loss of  autonomy 
that the mother had suffered.76 Combining these approaches, the majority (Lords 
Bingham, Nicholls, Millet and Scott) awarded a lump sum of  £15,000 for loss of  
autonomy. This conventional award was not based on the fact that the mother 
70 McFarlane (n 2) [102]–[103] (Lord Clyde), [81]–[82] (Lord Steyn), [111] (Lord Millett).
71 Rees (n 51) [9]. 
72 ibid [147]. 
73 Gillian Douglas, ‘Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust’ [2004] Fam Law 22; Samantha 
Singer, ‘Clinical Negligence - Failed Sterilisation - Wrongful Conception’ (2004) 26 Journal of  
Social Welfare and Family Law 403, 413–414.
74 Rees (n 51) [7], [16], [32]–[33], [50], [86], [103].
75 McFarlane (n 2) [114].
76 Parkinson (n 63) [56].
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in this case was disabled. The ruling in Rees is therefore applicable in any case of  
wrongful conception, overruling both McFarlane and Parkinson at least in relation to 
the practical outcome.
Dissenting speeches were delivered by Lords Steyn, Hope, and Hutton, 
who held that the Court of  Appeal had decided Parkinson correctly and that the 
reasoning in Parkinson should also be applied in Rees.77 Lord Steyn and Lord Hope 
also expressed their concerns about the lack of  legal basis for the creation of  a 
conventional award.78 Both arguments, however, were clearly dismissed by the 
majority.
This judgment is the decisive step that English law has taken in the area 
of  wrongful life. The court, while not unanimous in outcome, unanimously held 
that the autonomy of  the mother required, at least in some cases, the award of  
damages. Contrary to the development in Germany, English law has evolved under 
the pressure of  wrongful conception. The important question after Rees is how the 
concept of  loss of  autonomy fits into the structure of  English tort law.
V. ConCeptualIsIng wrongful ConCeptIon
English law is now in uncharted territory. While some commentators have 
embraced Rees for the practical solution it provides,79 it is imperative to explore the 
theoretical questions raised by the judgment in Rees. This is not purely an academic 
exercise, but one of  high practical relevance as the new approach adopted by the 
House of  Lords will be the decisive authority when dealing with cases of  wrongful 
survival.80 In this regard, Parkinson (even if  it is still considered good law) cannot 
provide guidance as it, at its core, still stuck to the old concept of  compensating 
the financial loss. 
The first approach taken to conceptualise Rees understands the judgment 
to have acknowledged ‘loss of  autonomy’ as a regular actionable head of  damage 
in tort law which can be claimed under negligence, giving rise to substantial 
damages. I argue, however, that this approach is not supported by case law and is 
77 ibid [34]–[39], [54]–[69], [88]–[96].
78 ibid [40]–[47], [70]–[77].
79 Chico (n 61) 152–154.
80 Another case in which this discussion could have made a difference is B v IVF Hammersmith Ltd v 
R [2018] EWCA Civ 2803. However, the Court of  Appeal did not discuss the question of  loss of  
autonomy in this case, which is why this decision will not be discussed here.
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not conceptually sound. After discussing this issue, I turn to an alternative concept 
that understands wrongful conception to be a new intentional tort.
a. aCtIonaBIlIty of “loss of autonomy” In neglIgenCe
Acknowledging loss of  autonomy as a regular actionable head of  damage 
in tort law has been supported by various legal scholars.81 It has been recognised 
as the right step to acknowledge the importance of  individual autonomy, especially 
in modern medical law, moving away from the strongly criticised focus on 
paternalism.82 This opinion raises two fundamental questions. Firstly, does loss of  
autonomy fit into the structure of  English tort law? Secondly, is loss of  autonomy 
as an actionable head of  damage supported by case law?
With regard to the first question, I argue that acknowledging loss of  
autonomy as actionable damage does not fit into the structure of  English tort 
law or would at least constitute a dramatic shift that requires further justification. 
Regarding the second question, I argue that Rees does not support this concept. I 
further argue that the law of  false imprisonment, which also relates to questions of  
autonomy, also cannot provide a foundation for acknowledging loss of  autonomy 
as these cases are not comparable to wrongful conception and general loss of  
autonomy.
(i) Loss of  autonomy and the structure of  negligence
The structure of  the tort of  negligence is to protect abstract rights by 
offering compensation for loss in ‘real-world interests’ which correspond to these 
abstract rights. Substantial damages for the infringement of  an abstract right, 
so-called vindicatory damages, were explicitly rejected by a 6–3 majority of  the 
Supreme Court in R (on the application of  Congo (Lumba)) v Secretary of  State for the 
Home Department.83 Substantial damages therefore cannot be based solely on the 
infringement of  a right. The building blocks of  substantial damages are the factual 
81 Donal Nolan, ‘New Forms of  Damage in Negligence’ (2007) 70 MLR 59, 77–80; Tsachi Ker-
en-Paz, ‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy in English Negligence Law: Inconsistent Recognition’ 
(2018) 26 MedLR 585; Nicolette Priaulx, The Harm Paradox: Tort Law and the Unwanted Child in an 
Era of  Choice (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 78; Craig Purshouse, ‘Judicial Reasoning and the Con-
cept of  Damage: Rethinking Medical Negligence Cases’ (2015) 15 MedLInt 155, 176–181.
82 Priaulx (n 81); Tsachi Keren-Paz, ‘Compensating Injury to Autonomy: A Conceptual and Norma-
tive Analysis: in: Kit Barker and others (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing 2017) 
411–439.
83 [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 AC 245. For a different approach, see Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 
2007). His concept, however, has not been adopted by the courts.
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consequences connected to the infringement of  a right. This moves the centre of  
attention from abstract ideas to factual, real-world states of  matter. 
The idea of  autonomy is an abstract one. Autonomy in this context describes 
the idea ‘self-authorship’ of  one’s destiny.84 The basic principle is that every human 
has the right – and capability – to make his or her own decisions. This idea, 
however, does not have an equally corresponding real-world interest, because the 
right to autonomous decisions does not mean that there is a protected real-world 
interest according to which the world is shaped according to our decisions. There 
is only the interest in the chance that the world would correspond to our decisions. 
This is what Lord Bingham seems to have been discussing as the “opportunity 
[of  the mother] to live her life in the way that she wished and planned”.85 The 
conceptual object of  compensation in wrongful conception cases would therefore 
be the loss of  the chance to put a ‘family plan’ into practice.
The question, ultimately, is whether this loss of  chance can – and should 
– be calculated. This has a practical side, as there is no clear basis for calculating 
damages.86 It also has to be kept in mind that this concept would not only apply 
in wrongful conception cases but has the potential to apply to a variety of  cases, 
bearing the risk of  arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. From a policy perspective, 
one could also make the argument that evaluating the loss of  chance as a 
consequence of  an infringement of  autonomy bears the risk of  promoting further 
commercialisation of  important areas of  human autonomy. It could be the first 
price tag to be put on reproductive autonomy. As unpalatable as this may seem, 
however, the alternative might be to not sufficiently protect autonomy. The policy 
issue should therefore not be overestimated.
This question also directly relates to the concept of  damage. Damage has 
often been thought to be ‘an abstract concept of  being worse off’.87 Loss of  autonomy 
challenges this concept in two ways, as Purshouse has pointed out.88 Firstly, loss of  
autonomy can often lead to a state in which the claimant is objectively better off.89 
Secondly, whether loss of  autonomy leaves someone worse off is dependent on 
whether this person was planning on exercising their autonomy.90 In this regard, 
the damage would be subjective instead of  objective, which differs from the 
84 For further discussion and reference see Keren-Paz (n 81) 587–588.
85 Rees (n 51) [8].
86 In this regard, however, commentators have expressed their faith in the judiciary to find suitable 
measurements, see Purshouse (n 81); Nolan (n 81) 87.
87 Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd UKHL [2007] 39, [2008] 1 AC 281 [289] (Lord Hoff-
mann).
88 See Craig Purshouse ‘Liability for Lost Autonomy in Negligence: Undermining the Coherence of  
Tort Law?’ [2015] 22 Torts Law J 226.
89 ibid 237–238. Purshouse uses Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 as an example.
90 ibid 238.
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conventional assessment of  damage. Ultimately, human autonomy is of  such a 
different quality compared to other kinds of  damage, that the concepts developed 
in negligence are simply not suited to accommodate the concept of  autonomy. 
It is therefore submitted that loss of  autonomy should not constitute a 
regular head of  damage. While I agree that there is a need to further integrate 
questions of  autonomy into tort law, this is not the way forward. It would lead to a 
significant amount of  uncertainty and call into question the concepts of  negligence 
in a way that could cause serious incoherence.
(ii) Loss of  autonomy and the case law
Nevertheless, the second question regarding the support of  case law still 
needs to be answered. The first judgment that could provide the foundation for 
loss of  autonomy in the law of  negligence is Rees. In Rees, however, the complex 
issues discussed above were not addressed by the majority, which simply adopted a 
number proposed by Lord Bingham. As the acceptance of  loss of  autonomy as an 
actionable loss would bring a significant change to the English tort law system, it is 
argued that the decision in Rees does not offer enough support for it to be deemed 
the law. 91 It is important to remember that English law, like other jurisdictions, has 
chosen to adopt a careful approach to acceptance of  non-pecuniary damages. This 
criticism is supported by the decision in Shaw v Kovac where the Court of  Appeal 
rejected the approach in Rees as “contrary to principle”.92 It has also been thought 
that Rees conceptually contradicts the decision in Chester v Afshar.93 
While Rees does not therefore support this new concept, other judgments 
might. The area of  law that could answer this question is the law of  false 
imprisonment, as it also relates to questions of  autonomy. In this area, English 
courts have developed a complex jurisprudence on the measurement of  damages 
that could be seen as compensation for loss of  autonomy, resulting in awards ranging 
from as little as five94 to tens of  thousands95 of  pounds. The damages in these cases 
were awarded for the consequences of  the infringement of  the right to personal 
freedom (of  movement): loss of  time, loss of  reputation, mental suffering caused 
by the feeling of  being locked in.96 In this area of  the law, the courts, almost tacitly, 
have acknowledged the immediate factual consequence (namely loss of  time) of  
91 Purshouse (n 81).
92 [2017] EWCA Civ 1028 [67]. See Keren-Paz (n 81) 599–602 where he offers a different interpre-
tation to the ratio in this decision to reconcile it with the actionability of  loss of  autonomy.
93 [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134; see Purshouse (n 81).
94 Walker v Commissioner of  the Police of  the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 897, [2015] 1 WLR 312.
95 See for example £17,500 in R (on the application of  MK (Algeria)) v Secretary of  State for the Home Depart-
ment [2010] EWCA Civ 980, [2010] 4 WLUK 517.
96 James Edelman, McGregor on Damages (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) para 42-013.
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the infringement of  autonomy as recoverable damage. However, loss of  time is a 
head of  damage that raises far fewer controversial questions than loss of  autonomy 
in general or loss of  reproductive autonomy specifically. The judgments regarding 
false imprisonment have consequently not addressed the issues laid out above. 
Therefore, whilst in this area of  law there has been a partial acknowledgement 
of  a specific loss of  autonomy as recoverable damage, this does not provide any 
justification outside the tort of  false imprisonment. 
Therefore, both conceptual theory and case law do not support the 
acknowledgement of  loss of  autonomy as actionable damage. While the support 
of  case law could, of  course, change over time, the theoretical arguments stand. 
There is, however, an alternative: the recognition of  a new intentional tort.
B. wrongful ConCeptIon as an IntentIonal tort
The second approach, which is often mentioned but seems to have 
garnered less support, is that wrongful conception should be regarded as a new 
kind of  intentional tort.97 Such a tort would be actionable per se, which is prima facie 
attractive. It avoids the problem of  fitting autonomy into the concept of  damages 
in negligence, while still protecting the idea of  autonomy. It also seems to fit into 
the general concept of  intentional torts, which is to protect certain rights that are 
regarded as especially important. Looking at the tort of  trespass to the person, 
there is already a significant protection of  important areas of  autonomy. While 
autonomy as a concept is too broad to be protected by a tort of  ‘infringement 
of  autonomy’, there is justification for protecting further specific areas. Especially 
from a perspective of  gender equality, as Hale LJ has rightly pointed out, the right 
of  a woman to decide if  and when to have children is worthy of  such further 
protection.
I find this concept to be persuasive. An intentional tort that is shaped 
according to the principles of  English tort law, provides a suitable method to 
integrate loss of  autonomy into English tort law without undermining settled 
concepts. It would bring at least some acknowledgment that a legal wrong has 
been committed and someone’s rights have been infringed. However, this concept 
is in conflict with the judgment in Rees and is not suitable for providing appropriate 
financial support for families that are ‘burdened’ with cases of  wrongful conception. 
This is because firstly, the facts of  Rees, and the facts of  most cases of  wrongful 
conception, do not allow an application of  an intentional tort as they are usually 
based on negligence, and secondly, because this tort cannot provide a remedy that 
amounts to £15,000. Hence, after laying out the conceptual shape of  the tort 
97 Shaun Elijah Tan, ‘The Right Approach to Wrongful Conception’ (2015) 4 OUULJ 28, who, 
however, does not discuss the question of  substantial damages for ‘loss of  autonomy’. 
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and the remedies available under this tort, I will discuss the relationship between 
this concept and Rees and argue that, instead of  Rees, financial support should be 
provided by a statutory provision.
(i) The conceptual shape
To stay within the principles of  English law, the tort of  wrongful conception 
(or infringement of  autonomy) would need to be conceptually shaped in a way 
that is equal to other torts protecting autonomy, such as the tort of  trespass to the 
person.98 The implications of  this are twofold. 
Firstly, this means that not all conduct can generate liability. Because there 
is no general duty to comply with the wishes of  other people, a mere omission is 
not sufficient. However, conduct that intervenes with another person’s autonomy 
by actively preventing them from acting on their wishes, is conduct that does 
not comply with the right to autonomy. Take, for example, the case of  a doctor 
carrying out a sterilisation against a patient’s will.99 This does not only infringe the 
right to bodily integrity but also actively interferes with the possibility of  the patient 
to exercise their reproductive autonomy.
Secondly, this imposes the requirement of  intentional conduct, just as 
trespass to the person100 requires intentional conduct.101 The requirement of  intent 
for a tort to be actionable per se is a fundamental principle of  English tort law, 
because only intentional conduct constitutes the kind of  anti-social behaviour that 
justifies nominal damages.102 This is especially true with regard to infringement 
of  autonomy, because the autonomy of  the victim is something that is not easily 
foreseeable (and not actually visible) by the tortfeasor and therefore constitutes a 
high risk of  negligent behaviour.
As the tortfeasor of  an intentional tort has to intend to infringe the specific 
right that is protected, the test for intent in this case would have to be whether the 
defendant intended to interfere with the autonomous choice of  the victim to have 
(or not to have) children. The tortfeasor therefore also has to know, that the victim 
wanted to exercise their reproductive autonomy in a certain way, otherwise there 
is no intentional interference. It might be argued that just like accepting loss of  
98 The following implications were not discussed by Tan (n 97), who seems to favour a tort that 
would also apply to the facts of  Rees. 
99 This case seems to raise similar questions as the case of  IVF Hammersmith (n 80), which shows that 
the Court of  Appeal has missed a chance to discuss these questions.
100 Fowler v Lanning [1959] 1 QB 426 (CA).
101 Nolan (n 81) 79.
102 Frederick Pollock, The Law of  Torts (15th edn, Stevens and Sons 1951) 139; Abraham Harari, The 
Place of  Negligence in the Law of  Torts (The Law Book Co. of  Australasia Pty Ltd 1962) 145: “There is 
no affront in negligent contact.” 
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autonomy as a head of  damage, this also brings the subjective will of  the victim 
into tort law. However, this counter-argument should be rejected. It is a different 
question whether the tortfeasor has to be aware of  the victims wishes in order to 
commit a tort at all or whether the victims wishes, without considering whether 
the tortfeasor was aware of  them, decide on the existence and amount of  damage.
(ii) The available remedies
The next conceptual question that needs to be answered is what remedies 
are available to the claimant under this new tort, most importantly whether 
substantial damages are available. Substantial damages cannot be based on the loss 
caused by the maintenance of  the child as held in McFarlane and Rees. As shown, 
loss of  autonomy does not give rise to substantial damages. Acknowledgement 
of  this head of  damage also does not follow from the acknowledgement of  an 
intentional tort of  wrongful conception. It is a completely different question 
whether the law recognises the infringement of  a right as a legal wrong or whether 
it regards the immediate factual consequence of  this infringement as recoverable, 
monetary loss. No conclusion with regard to the latter question can be drawn from 
the answer given to the former. The gap between the two is filled by the concept 
of  nominal damages. If  the acknowledgement of  an intentional tort would lead 
to the acknowledgement of  the immediate consequences as recoverable damage, 
there would be no need for the concept of  nominal damage, as there would always 
automatically be recoverable damage. 
Notwithstanding this issue, a court may, however, award nominal damages 
based on the concept of  wrongful conception as an intentional tort. This does 
not raise the same questions as awarding substantial damages, as the purpose 
of  nominal damages is not to compensate a loss the claimant has suffered but to 
acknowledge a legal wrong that has been committed. Therefore, autonomy would 
in this case only be acknowledged as an abstract right without the need to fit it into 
the regular concept of  damage. Although nominal damages only amount to a few 
pounds, this way there is at least legal recognition of  the loss of  autonomy that has 
been suffered. This is the decisive difference to handling wrongful conception in 
the law of  negligence.
(iii) The conflict with Rees
However, this conceptualisation of  wrongful conception does not fully 
support the decision in Rees. While the doctor in Rees can be said to have actively 
interfered with the patient’s autonomy by giving the impression that the mother 
was now sterilised although she was not, he did not intend to interfere with her 
personal autonomy. The infringement was due to his mere negligence that caused 
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the failure of  the sterilisation procedure. The facts of  Rees could only fall under an 
intentional tort of  wrongful conception if  the doctor had intended not to carry 
out the sterilisation successfully while giving the impression that he did. Finally, 
there is no conceptual basis for the award of  £15,000. As stated above, there is no 
sufficient basis for substantial damages and the award of  £15,000 is too high to 
constitute nominal damages. 
The first question, that follows from this, is whether Rees should be treated 
as an authority in further cases that deal with infringement of  autonomy. I argue 
that it should not. The judgment on its own does not provide suitable groundwork 
for conceptualising infringement of  autonomy in tort law. Even more so, it stands 
in the way of  the concept that was laid out above and that I argue should be 
acknowledged by English courts in the future. Rees should be treated as an 
anomalous decision without further authority with regard to loss of  autonomy in 
general.
The second question is how to deal with the £15,000 that was awarded in 
Rees and has been awarded by courts since. It is submitted that, notwithstanding that 
Rees should not be regarded as authority, the award is justified from a perspective of  
social policy. Parents, who never wanted to be parents, should receive basic financial 
support. This serves, first and foremost, the interest of  the child, as financial 
support for the parents contributes to a safe and healthy environment for the child 
to grow up in. But it also mitigates the impact on the parents and especially the 
mother that are struck by a heavy financial burden that they did not expect. This 
conclusion has, in my view, been the decisive factor in all English (and German) 
decisions, the problem was that there is no suitable legal basis for a financial award 
without causing friction with questions of  legal policy, especially the question of  
whether categorizing something as damage in a legal sense is morally offensive. It 
is not sufficient to base an award on social policy, without providing a sound legal 
concept that the award flows from. A statutory compensation scheme, however, is 
not bound to doctrinal reasoning.
The way forward is to accept that Rees is, at its core, a judicial compensation 
scheme serving purposes of  social policy. It would be favourable to provide for the 
Rees-compensation in a piece of  parliamentary legislation, where it belongs better. 
This would allow the courts to further develop the doctrine of  autonomy in tort 
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law, without having to deal with the shackles of  Rees and without having to sacrifice 
the support provided to the parents.
C. ConClusIon: lIfe after rees
A few concluding remarks should be made. The discussion has shown that it 
is imperative to differentiate between different questions of  policy. The courts have 
dealt with questions of  legal policy, i.e. the sanctity of  life, while aiming for a result 
that serves social policy, namely the financial support of  the parents. This has led 
to incoherence and uncertainty in the law. Instead, the issue of  social policy, should 
be dealt with by parliament. I argue that there is a strong case for supporting 
the parents. This, however, has to be kept separate from the legal questions. The 
question of  infringement of  autonomy, that the House of  Lords stumbled upon in 
Rees, should be further developed by acknowledging a tort, structured as laid out 
above, that is actionable per se. Rees should no longer be regarded as authority in 
this regard.
VI. tHe next CHapter: wrongful surVIVal
Today, almost 20 years after Rees, there is a new challenge: wrongful 
survival. In these cases, damages are claimed because a life has been prolonged 
unnecessarily or against the patient’s will. While there is no English decision on this 
matter to date, the according set of  facts have also recently come before the courts 
in the US.103 The personal decision to die and consciously reject life-prolonging 
measures is one of  great present relevance, which is why wrongful survival has also 
been discussed in the media104 and which is also why it is likely that this question 
will be brought to English courts. 
These cases are an ideal test tube for the concepts discussed above. On the 
one hand, they raise similar issues of  legal policy and legal concepts while on the 
other hand, they do not concern social policy to the same extent. There is no need 
103 Doctors Hospital of  Augusta LLC v Alicea [2016] 299 Ga 315 (Supreme Court of  Georgia). The Court 
held that the patients’ decision to die is binding without, however, deciding on damages.
104 See for example Paula Span, ‘The Patients Were Saved. That’s Why the Families Are Suing.’ (The 
New York Times, 10 April 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/health/wrongful-life-
lawsuit-dnr.html> (accessed 2 August 2020).
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for basic financial support, from a policy point of  view, for people whose lives have 
been prolonged.
a. germany
The BGH considered this new kind of  claim in 2019, thirty-five years after 
the rubella-case. The case concerned a man who suffered from severe dementia. 
He had been unable to move unassisted since 2003 and had been unable to 
communicate since at least 2008. He had been artificially nourished since 2006 
and died in 2011. His son brought a claim against the doctor responsible for the 
treatment. The claimant argued that the artificial nourishment had not been 
supported by medical necessity at least after 2010. He claimed damages for the pain 
suffered by his father, for his loss of  autonomy and for the medical bills generated 
by the prolonged medical assistance.105 The LG Munich I dismissed the claims, but 
the OLG Munich overturned this decision in part, awarding damages amounting 
to 40,000€ for the pain suffered.106 The BGH allowed the defendant’s appeal and 
dismissed the claimant’s cross-appeal, dismissing all heads of  damage.107 The claim 
regarding medical bills was dismissed on the grounds of  a principle of  German 
contract law that is not relevant to the issues discussed here. I will only discuss the 
other two heads of  damage.
(i) Damages for Suffering
The court began its discussion by referring to its decision in the rubella-case. 
After laying down the ratio of  that case, the court stated that the difference of  this 
new case is that the decision of  life and death was made at the end of  a human life. 
Whilst an unborn child does not have a legally acknowledged possibility to make 
a decision on its own life, the man in this case did.108 However, the BGH applied 
the same principles as in the rubella-case. The BGH did not discuss the question of  
whether the continuation of  the artificial nourishment constituted a breach of  duty 
with regard to the medical situation of  the patient but only because, just as in the 
rubella-case, there was no damage that could be claimed. The court held that even 
105 This claim, if  it existed, would originally have been a claim of  the patient. However, following 
his death, it would have been transferred to the son by way of  universal succession as heir of  the 
deceased (Erbrechtliche Gesamtrechtsnachfolge) according to s 1922 BGB. 
106 OLG Munich 1 U 454/17, FamRZ 2018, 723.
107 BGH VI ZR 13/18, NJW 2019, 1741.
108 See s 1901a BGB regarding patients’ decrees (Patientenverfügungen). The English equivalent is dis-
cussed in the next section.
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if  the law acknowledges the individual right to regard one’s own life as not worth 
preserving, a court cannot do so: 
Even if  the patient regards its own life as not worth living, the 
constitution prohibits any agent of  the state including the judiciary 
to pass such a judgment on the life of  the patient affected in 
concluding that this life is damage.
Auch wenn der Patient selbst sein Leben als lebensunwert erachten 
mag, verbietet die Verfassungsordnung aller staatlichen Gewalt 
einschließlich der Rechtsprechung ein solches Urteil über das 
Leben des betroffenen Patienten mit der Schlussfolgerung, dieses 
Leben sei ein Schaden.109
The court also briefly put forward the second argument known from the 
rubella-case and McKay, namely that there is no way to determine whether life 
with a disease is in any way worse than death.110 This approach has been largely 
supported by academic writers before and after the decision.111 In this regard, the 
decision is largely a rerun of  the rubella-judgment.
(ii) Damages for Loss of  Autonomy
The last head of  damage was only briefly mentioned by the BGH, even 
though the court found the autonomy of  the patient to be the distinguishing feature 
in this new case. The court held that it did not need to decide on the issue as there 
was no evidence that the patient wanted to die, unlike in wrongful conception cases 
where there is clear evidence that the parents did not want children. 
This issue has therefore still not been decided in Germany. Similarly, 
academic commentary has so far only mentioned this question, but has not yet 
discussed it in detail.112 Cases in which this claim could be pursued, however, are 
rare because claims based on a violation of  autonomy would have to be brought 
under infringement personality rights (Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung) and such claims 
are generally not inherited by the legal successor.113 Therefore, the claim would 
109 BGH VI ZR 13/18, NJW 2019, 1743. 
110 ibid. 
111 See Ludyga NZFam 2017, 595; Prütting ZfL 2018, 94. For a different opinion, see Zimmermann ZfL 
2018, 104.
112 See Zimmermann (n 111); Spickhoff NJW 2019, 1718, 1719. 
113 BGH VI ZR 246/12, NJW 2014, 2871.
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have to be pursued by the patient during his or her lifetime and this poses some 
practical challenges.114
B. england and wales
So far, this kind of  case has not been argued before English courts. However, 
looking at the issues they pose, they might well be the next challenge for English 
law in this area. In the following, I will apply the different concepts in English law 
to the issues raised by the German case.
(i) Damages for Suffering
The first question an English court would have to answer is whether there is 
a cause of  action for the pain and suffering brought on by prolonging an individual’s 
life. In view of  McKay, such a cause of  action does not exist. Just as in McKay, 
there is no duty of  care to stop life-prolonging measures based merely on medical 
indication. While the Supreme Court in An NHS Trust v Y115 decided that life-
prolonging measures can be withdrawn in cases of  best-interest without obtaining 
a court order, this does not impose a duty, just like how the legal possibility to have 
an abortion does not impose a duty. The second argument accepted in McKay is 
also applicable. Damages for a prolonged life are just as incalculable as damages 
for being born at all. Therefore, an English court is highly likely to come to the 
same conclusion as the BGH and dismiss the claim.
(ii) Damages for Loss of  Autonomy
The challenge for English law lies in the second head of  damage: damages 
for loss of  autonomy. As laid out above, the BGH did not decide on this issue and 
it has not been adequately discussed in German literature. That is not surprising, 
as the BGH has so far kept the question of  autonomy out of  all cases of  wrongful 
existence. In Rees, the House of  Lords, however, set sail in these uncharted waters, 
making it necessary to elaborate on this point. 
Under English law, the autonomy to refuse life-saving treatment has been 
implemented in Section 24–26 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (hereafter “the Act”). 
According to Section 24 of  the Act, patients aged 18 and older can draw up an 
Advance Decision (AD) on lifesaving treatment. According to Section 26(1) of  the 
Act, this decision is legally binding. A doctor can be held liable for violating an AD. 
This liability is only limited by Section 26(2) of  the Act, providing that there is no 
liability where the person carrying out the treatment is satisfied that there is a valid 
and applicable AD. When the Act was passed into law, the Government had in 
114 cf  Bach NJW 2019, 1915, 1917.
115 [2018] UKSC 46, [2018] 3 WLR 751.
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mind civil liability for battery and criminal liability for assault.116 However, as there 
is no general limit to claims imposed by the Act, a claim for loss of  autonomy after 
a violation of  an AD can go forward, subject only to the limitation of  Section 26(2) 
of  the Act. The success of  this claim, however, is dependent on which concept is 
applied, which will be shown in the following. 
The first important issue to note is that by claiming loss of  autonomy, the 
case of  wrongful survival frees itself  from the notion of  the sanctity of  life expressed 
in McKay. An unborn foetus does not have the autonomy to end his or her own life 
whereas a born human does. Therefore, if  the law is to acknowledge the autonomy 
to die (as it has in the Act), this cannot logically violate the sanctity of  human life. 
This aspect of  McKay is not relevant for cases of  wrongful survival. 
The next step to moving this case closer to cases of  wrongful conception, 
is to compare the type of  autonomy. While the decision in Rees and most of  the 
academic commentary have been limited to cases of  wrongful conception, there 
is no reason not to give the same treatment to other areas of  autonomy that are 
equally important and equally protected by the law. At the same time, the law 
cannot protect every type of  autonomy. Yet, it is submitted that there can be no 
difference made between this case and Rees. The autonomy to choose death over 
a prolonged life is an achievement of  modern legal thinking that steers clear of  
medical paternalism. As shown above it is also respected by statutory law. In my 
view, there is no justification for treating this case any different than wrongful 
conception. 
An important question lies in the second limb of  the McKay decision. As laid 
out above, the court rejected the claim on the basis that the damages could not be 
calculated, because the state that was to be contemplated was nonexistence. The 
same applies in this case if  one was to regard the loss of  autonomy as a regular 
head of  damage under tort law. In this case, a court would have to ask what state 
of  autonomy would have existed had the duty not been breached and the answer 
would be: no state of  autonomy. Had the defendant complied with the duty of  
care, the claimant would be dead. Just as it is not possible to compare a state of  
suffering with death, it is not possible to compare a state of  infringed autonomy 
with death. Consequently, following McKay, the claim would have to fail if  the 
claimant claims loss of  autonomy as a regular head of  damage. 
A different result is reached by applying the concept of  loss of  autonomy 
as a tort actionable per se. In this case, it is not necessary to compare the different 
situations, as nominal damages would be available. Section 26(2) of  the Act does 
not change the elements of  this tort: it has to be intentional regardless. Applying 
this concept, a patient who is kept alive by a doctor who refused to comply with an 
116 Explanatory Note to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, para 91. 
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AD – while being well aware of  the AD – would be entitled to nominal damages 
for infringement of  autonomy. Nominal damages might not seem sufficient 
to acknowledge the extent of  the legal wrong that was committed. However, 
it is the only remedy that is available in English law, as for the reasons above, 
compensatory damages are not available even if  one was to acknowledge loss of  
autonomy as a regular head of  damage. Unless the Supreme Court changes its 
opinion on vindicatory damages, no other remedy is available.117 I believe this to be 
a convincing approach that achieves a reasonable result. Should an English court 
be presented with this type of  case, it is advised that this approach be followed. 
VII. ConClusIon: wrongful exIstenCe – a matter of autonomy?
A comparative analysis of  wrongful existence in Germany and England 
highlights the different ways in which these cases can be approached. Both 
jurisdictions are united in their view of  the comparatively ‘simple’ cases of  
wrongful life: simple because the notion of  autonomy is not in question in these 
cases. Cases of  wrongful conception, however, raise both questions of  financial 
loss and loss of  autonomy. The different causes of  actions and the views on the 
financial loss taken by the House of  Lords and the BGH have forced English and 
German law to go separate ways. The comparatively modest approach of  the 
BGH – to decide wrongful conception and wrongful survival based on the existing 
legal concepts and without discussing issues of  autonomy – has led to decisions 
that offer a degree of  certainty. However, as a result of  this approach, the BGH 
has (arguably consciously) neglected the concept of  loss of  autonomy, and it is yet 
to be explored in German law. This is especially relevant as in cases of  wrongful 
survival, as has been shown, different concepts of  loss of  autonomy might lead to 
completely different outcomes. English law has set foot in this territory following 
Rees. However, as laid out above, Rees is not the suitable starting point and loss of  
autonomy as regular damage is not the right concept for solving these cases. This 
article has instead proposed a new tort that is actionable per se. Should an English 
court be confronted with a case of  wrongful survival, it is submitted that it should 
apply this new tort. Such a decision could be the cornerstone of  a new area of  
tort law and will have implications beyond England and Wales, maybe even for 
Germany.
117 This does not seem likely, as the Supreme Court has unanimously continued to follow this ap-
proach, see R (on the application of  O) v Secretary of  the State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 19, 
[2016] 1 WLR 1717.
